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CHARACTERIZING DEMAND FUNCTIONS WITH PRICE
DEPENDENT INCOME
MARWAN ALOQEILI
Abstract. We consider the demand function of consumer whose wealth de-
pends on prices. This extends the two traditional cases when the consumer
holds a goods bundle, so that his wealth depends linearly on prices, and when
his wealth is prescribed, independently of prices. We extend the Slutsky rela-
tions to this general case, and we show that they fully characterize the demand
functions, as in the traditional cases.
Keywords: Slutsky matrix, Demand function, Indirect utility, Mathematical in-
tegration, Economic integration.
Part 1. Introduction
The economics of ecient group behavior has recently attracted renewed atten-
tion from economists.1 One basic framework can be described as follows. Con-
sider a K-person group in a n-commodity framework. The group is endowed with
some aggregate income y, which by homogeneity can be normalized to be 1; this
income can be used to purchase some (aggregate) bundle X under the budget con-
straint p0X = 1. All commodities are privately consumed; following the standard,
`collective' approach, we assume that the internal decision process always gener-
ates ecient outcomes. What does theory predict regarding the group's behavior?
Specically, is the eciency assumption testable? More generally, is it possible to
nd necessary and sucient conditions for eciency?
The answer to that question obviously depends on the type of data available.
One polar case obtains when only the group's aggregate demand X (p) is observable.
In this case, a result by Chiappori and Ekeland (2009) states that the eciency
assumption is testable if and only if the size of the group is smaller than the number
of commodities; the authors derive conditions on X (p) that fully characterize the
eciency assumption. This result has been widely applied empirically, in partic-
ular to the analysis of household behavior.However, an increasing number of data
sets provide much richer information than the sole aggregate consumption at the
group (or household) level. An opposite, and increasingly interesting polar case is
therefore one in which individual consumptions within the group are fully recorded;
i.e., one can observe the vector xk (p) for k = 1; :::;K. In such a framework, what
are the implications of eciency? For instance, in an ecient household, what
properties (if any) should individual demand functions satisfy?
Surprisingly enough, the answer to that question is still an open problem. The
diculty, here, comes from the following issue. From the second welfare theorem,
I would like to thank I. Ekeland and G. Carlier for helpful discussions during my visit to the
University Paris-Dauphine in September 2010 where the major part of this article was written.
1See [7] for a recent survey.
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any ecient allocation can be decentralized: there exists functions w1 (p) ; :::; wK (p),
with
P
k w
k (p) = 1, such that xk (p) maximizes member k's utility under the bud-
get constraint p0xk (p) = wk (p). We are thus left with the following question: can
we nd necessary and sucient conditions for a function xk (p) to solve a maxi-
mization problem of this type? In the particular case in which wk (p) is constant,
the answer has been known since the pioneering work of Antonelli [3] and Slut-
sky [11]: individual demand functions are fully characterized by the fact that the
associated Slutsky matrices are symmetric and negative denite. This is quite an
important property. On the one hand, since demand functions can be observed, the
Slutsky relations provide a testable consequence of utility maximization; empirical
tests have been carried out, and provide a validation of current theory (see [4]). On
the other, the preference relation can be recovered from the demand function, and
this has obvious policy and welfare implications. Another particular case, which
has been recently studied, obtains when wk (p) is linear - i.e., wk (p) = p0!k where
!k is a positive initial endowment. Then xk (p) is an individual excess demand
function, whose properties have been fully characterized by Chiappori and Ekeland
[8].
The problem is that these cases are extremely specic. Assume that the intra-
household allocation of income - the wk (p) functions - stem from some (ecient)
bargaining process. Then it is very unlikely that the outcome will involve either
xed or linear allocations; actually, the empirical literature suggests much more
complex forms for the sharing rule. The problem is particularly acute when intra-
group production is taken into account - an aspect which is important in developed
economies and absolutely crucial in developing ones. Generally speaking, whenever
production is involved, individuals receive income from production activities; since
production functions are typically nonlinear, this will result in nonlinear eects,
and individual shares will be nonlinear functions of prices.
In such a general context, where wk (p) is a known but arbitrary function of
prices, little is known about the structure of individual demands. The goal of the
present note is precisely to ll this gap, and to study the properties of individual
demands stemming from the maximization of individual utility when the individual
budget set is given by:
Bg (p) := fx  0 j px  w (p)g
where w (p) is a prescribed function of the prices p.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The model is introduced in the
next section. In section 2, some preliminary results are given. The main results
are given in section 3. In section 4, the problem of characterizing homogeneous
demand functions is considered. In the last section, two particular cases are given
in which the individual income is price dependent. Namely, we consider an exchange
economy and an economy with production.
1. The model
We consider the individual problem in which the agent's income is a function of
the price vector p 2 Rn++. The consumer faces a problem of the following form
(P)
(
max
x
U(x)
p0x = w(p)
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This kind of problems arise in many economic contexts. Two examples of such
models will be given in the last section. We need to adopt some assumptions to
insure existence and dierentiability of demand functions. We suppose that the
utility function is smooth, increasing and concave in a strong sense, namely:
Assumption 1. We assume that the function U(x) satises the following condi-
tions:
 the function U is of class C3 on Rn++.
 the gradient rU (x) belongs to Rn++.
 the Hessian matrix of U is negative denite on frUg?.
These assumptions guarantee the existence, uniqueness and dierentiability of
the solution x (p) 2 Rn++. The constraint is binding:
p0x (p) = w (p)
and there is a Lagrange multiplier  (p)  0 , so that the problem (P) can be
restated as:
max
x
fU (x) +  (p) (w (p)  p0x)g
We prove now the following preliminary result
Lemma 1. If the utility function U(x) satises the conditions of Assumption (1)
and if w(p) is of class C2 then the map p ! x (p) and the function p !  (p) are
of class C2.
Proof. We apply the implicit function theorem. The functions x(p) and (p) are
dened implicitly by the n+ 1 conditions
DxU(x)  p = 0
p0x  w(p) = 0
Let F : Rn  Rn  R ! Rn+1 be dened by F (p; x; ) = (F1(p; x; ); F2(p; x; ))
where F1(p; x; ) = DxU(x)  p 2 Rn and F2(p; x; ) = p0x w(p) 2 R. To apply
the implicit function theorem, it suces to show that the matrix
Dx;F =

DxF1 DF1
DxF2 DF2

=

D2xxU(x)  p
p0 0

is nonsingular. Let  = (n; 1) 2 Rn  R. We will show that the linear sys-
tem (Dx;F ) = 0 has only the zero solution. This system can be written in an
equivalent form as
D2xxU(x)
n   p1 = 0
p0n = 0
It follows that n 2 fpg? = frUg?. Multiply the rst equality by n0 we get
n0(D2xxU(x))
n = 0
Since n 2 frUg? and D2xxU is negative denite on this subspace, we conclude
that n = 0 and therefore  = 0 is the only solution. So the matrix Dx;F is
nonsingular and we can apply the implicit function theorem which guarantees that
x(p) and (p) are of class C2. The proof is complete.

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Introduce the indirect utility function
(1) V (p) = U (x(p)) +  (p) (w (p)  p0x(p))
The envelope theorem implies that the derivative of the function V with respect to
pi is given by
(2)
@V
@pi
= (p)

@w
@pi
  xi(p)

; i = 1;    ; n
Some properties of the indirect utility function V is given by the following theorem
Theorem 1. Let V (p) be the indirect utility function dened by (1). Then V (p)
has the following properties:
a: Positively homogenous of degree zero if w(p) is positively homogeneous of
degree one.
b: Quasiconvex if w(p) is convex.
Proof. (a) Suppose w(p) is positively homogenous of degree one. Then, for all
t  0, changing p to tp does not change the budget set in problem (P), so that
x (tp) = x (p) and V (p) = U (x (p)) is unchanged. To prove (b), we argue as in
Varian [12]. Suppose that V (p^)  u and V (p)  u. Let ~p = tp^+ (1  t)p. We want
to show that V (~p)  maxfV (p^); V (p)g. Introduce the following sets
S^ = fx j p^0x  w(p^)g; S = fx j p0x  w(p)g; ~S = fx j ~p0x  w(~p)g
We claim that ~S  S^ [ S. Indeed, if this is not the case then there exists x
such that p^0x > w(p^) and p0x > w(p) whereas ~p0x  w(~p). It follows that for any
t 2 (0; 1), tp^0x > tw(p^) and (1   t)p0x > (1   t)w(p). Adding up the last two
inequalities and using the convexity of w, we get
~p0x = (tp^0 + (1  t)p0)x > tw(p^) + (1  t)w(p)  w(tp^+ (1  t)p) = w(~p)
Hence ~p0x > w(~p) which is a contradiction, so ~S  S^ [ S as announced. This result
implies that
V (~p) = max
x2 ~S
U(x)  max
x2S^[ S
U(x) = maxfV (p^); V (p)g
Which means that V (p) is quasiconvex. The proof is complete. 
The indirect utility function can be written as V (p) = V (p; w(p)). The envelope
theorem implies that
(3)
@V
@w
(p; w(p)) = (p)
Using equation (2) and the fact that Dpw(p)  x(p) = p0Dpx(p), we get
@V (p; w(p))=@pi
@V (p; w(p))=@w
= p0Dpix(p)
which is a generalization of Roy's identity in the standard individual model. If
the income is price independent, w(p) = y, then p0Dpx(p; y) =  x(p; y), so we
get Roy's identity. The above equality means that a change in pi by dpi can be
compensated, to keep individual's utility constant, by a change in income which
equals to dw = p0(Dpix(p))dpi.
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2. Mathematical tools
In this section, we give some theorems from exterior dierential calculus (see [7],
part 2, for a primer, and [5] for a full exposition). The question to be answered
is the following. Given a vector eld in a space of dimension n, when can it be
decomposed as a linear combination of k gradients, with k < n ? This question is
best rephrased in the language of exterior dierential calculus: given a 1-form
! =
nX
i=1
!idpi
on a space of dimension n, when can one nd functions uj (p) and vj (p), with
1  j  k < n such that:
! =
kX
j=1
ujdvj
We refer to [7] and the literature therein, notably [1], [2], [8] for the mathemat-
ics and the economics of this question. The answer is provided by the following
theorems, which go back to Darboux:
Theorem 2. Let ! be a 1-form dened in a neighbourhood U of p in Rn. Suppose
that, we have
(4) ! ^ (d!)k 1 6= 0; (d!)k = 0 on U
Then there is a neighbourhood V  U of p and smooth functions v1 and
 
uj ; vj

,
2  j  k, such that the dvj and the duj do not vanish, and
(5) ! = dv1 +
kX
j=2
ujdvj on V
Conversely, if ! decomposes in the form (5) on U , and the dvj and the duj do not
vanish, then it satises condition (4) on U .
Proof. The case k = 1 states that ! = dv1 if and only if d! = 0, which is the
well-known Poincare Lemma. For k > 1, the converse is easy to prove. Indeed, if
! decomposes in the form (5), we have:
d! =
kX
j=2
duj ^ dvj
and
(d!)
k 1
= (k   1)!du2 ^ dv2 ^ ::: ^ duk ^ dvk
Then (d!)
k
= 0 follows immediately (note, however, that ! ^ (d!)k 1 6= 0). For
the direct part, we refer to [5]. 
We have also the following problem
Theorem 3. Let ! be a 1-form dened in a neighbourhood U of p in Rn. Suppose
that, on U , we have
(6) ! ^ (d!)k 1 6= 0; (d!)k 6= 0; ! ^ (d!)k = 0
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Then there is a neighbourhood V  U and smooth functions  uj ; vj, 1  j  k,
such that the dvj and the du
j do not vanish, and:
(7) ! =
kX
j=1
ujdvj on V
Conversely, if ! decomposes in the form (7) on U , and the dvj and the duj do
not vanish, then it satises condition (6) on U .
Proof. Again, the converse is easy. If the decomposition (7) holds, then:
(d!)
k
= k!du1 ^ dv1 ^ ::: ^ duk ^ dvk
and ! ^ (d!)k = 0. For the direct part, we refer to [5] 
Another result, due to Ekeland and Chiappori in the analytic case (the coe-
cients !i of the 1-form ! are supposed to be analytic functions of p), and to Ekeland
and Nirenberg [9] in the general case, addresses the problem of nding such decom-
positions when the functions vj are required to be convex and the u
i positive. We
state it as follows:
Theorem 4. Let ! be a smooth 1-form in the neighbourhood of some point p.
There exist 2k functions u1; :::; uk; v1; :::; vk such that ! can be decomposed as ! =
u1dv1+u
2dv2+   +ukdvk where the functions ui are positive and the vi are convex
if and only if
(1) ! ^ (d!)k = 0.
(2) There is a k-dimensional subspace S of I = f j ^!^ (d!)k 1 = 0g con-
taining !(p) such that on S?, the matrix !ij(p) is symmetric and positive
denite.
3. The non-homogeneous case
In this section, we assume that the income function w(p) is not positively ho-
mogeneous of degree one which means that the demand function and the indirect
utility function are not homogenous of degree zero. In particular, w (p) cannot be
constant. The case of homogeneous demand functions will be treated in the next
section.
We are given a smooth map x (p) from a neighbourhood of p in Rn+ to a neigh-
bourhood of x (p) in Rn++, and a smooth function w (p) = p
0x (p), which is not
1-homogeneous. We ask whether it is an individual demand function, that is,
whether there exists U (x) such that x (p) is the solution of problem (P).
Dene the dierential 1-form ! as follows:
(8) ! =
nX
i=1
xi(p)dpi
Using equation (2), the 1-form ! can be decomposed as
(9) ! = dV + dw
where
(p) =   1
(p)
< 0
Notice that ! has a decomposition of the form (5) and that d! = d^dV , !^d! =
dw^d^dV 6= 0 and d!^d! = 0. Therefore, the necessary and sucient condition
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for this decomposition is fullled. However, in our setting the income function w(p)
can be found from w(p) = p0x(p) once x(p) is given.
The problem of mathematical integration consists in nding  (p) and V (p) such
that the decomposition (9) holds. The problem of economic integration consists in
nding such a decomposition with  (p) < 0 and V (p) quasi-convex (see [7]).
3.1. Mathematical integration. A necessary condition can be obtained directly
from equation (2).
Lemma 2. Suppose x(p) is an individual demand function. Then Dpx(p) is the
sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank one.
Proof. Recall that
x(p) = (p)DpV (p) +Dpw(p)
Dierentiating both sides of this equation with respect to p, the matrix Dpx(p) can
be decomposed as
Dpx(p) = (p)D
2
ppV (p) +D
2
ppw(p) +Dp(p)(DpV (p))
0
Using the fact that DpV (p) = (p)(Dpw(p)  x(p)), we get
(10) Dpx(p) = (p)D
2
ppV (p) +D
2
ppw(p) +
Dp(p)
(p)
(x(p) Dpw(p))0
The rst two terms are symmetric while the last term is a rank one matrix as
required. 
It follows from the last result that the restriction of Dpx(p) to a subspace of
codimension one is symmetric. More precisely, let  2 fDpw(p)  x(p)g? then:
(11) 0Dpx(p) =   1
(p)
0D2ppV (p) + 
0D2ppw(p)
which means that the restriction of Dpx(p) to fDpV (p)g?, which is a subspace of
codimension one, is symmetric.
The following result provides a necessary and sucient condition, that is, a full
characterization.
Theorem 5. Let ! be the 1-form associated with x (p) by (8) and w(p) = p0x (p).
Then, ! can be decomposed as ! = dV + dw on some neighbourhood of p if and
only if the matrix
(12) S = Dpx+
1
p0(Dpx)p
((Dpx)
0  Dpx)pp0(Dpx)
is symmetric on some neighbourhood of p.
Proof. Suppose that ! = dV + dw, so that !   dw = dV . The last condition is
equivalent to:
(!   dw) ^ d! = 0
This, in turn, is equivalent to saying that there exists some 1-form  such that
(13) d! =  ^ (!   dw)
We shall determine the 1-form  (mod !   dw) by applying the vector eld
(14)  =
nX
i=1
pi
@
@pi
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to both sides of equation (13). This gives
(15) d!(; :) =  ^ (!   dw)(; :)
Expanding the right-hand side we nd that
 ^ (!   dw)(; :) = < ;  > (!   dw)  (w   p0Dw)
Equation (15) becomes
d!(; :) = < ;  > (!   dw)  (w   p0Dw)
Solving for , we get
 =
1
w   p0Dw ( d!(; :)+ < ;  > (!   dw))
Note that the denominator does not vanish, since w (p) has been assumed not to
be homogeneous. Plugging this value of  into equation (13), we obtain
(16) d! =
 1
w   p0Dwd!(; :) ^ (!   dw)
However, a direct computation gives:
d! =
X
i<j

@xi
@pj
  @x
j
@pi

dpj ^ dpi
d!(; :) =
X
j;k
@xj
@pk
pkdpj  
X
j;k
@xk
@pj
pkdpj(17)
Performing the exterior product in equation (16), we get:
d! =
1
w   p0Dw
X
i;j
X
k

@xk
@pj
pk(x
i   @w
@pi
)  @x
j
@pk
pk(x
i   @w
@pi
)

dpj ^ dpi
Let I = (w   p0Dpw(p)) 1. This equation takes the equivalent formX
i<j

@xi
@pj
  @x
j
@pi

dpj ^ dpi = I
nX
k=1
i<j

@xk
@pj
pk(x
i   @w
@pi
)  @x
j
@pk
pk(x
i   @w
@pi
)
  @x
k
@pi
pk(x
j   @w
@pj
) +
@xi
@pk
pk(x
j   @w
@pj
)

dpj ^ dpi
We conclude from the last equality that the matrix s dened by
(18) sij =
@xi
@pj
+
1
w   p0Dw
X
k

@xk
@pi
pk   @x
i
@pk
pk

(xj   @w
@pj
)
is symmetric.
We now recall that w (p) = p0x (p). Dierentiating with respect to pi, we get
(19)
X
k
@xk
@pi
pk + x
i =
@w
@pi
It follows that
(20) xi   @w
@pi
=  
X
k
@xk
@pi
pk =  p0Dpix
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Multiplying the last equation by pi and adding up yields
(21) w   p0Dpw =  p0(Dpx)p
Using (20) and (21), we can write (18) as
Sij =
@xi
@pj
+
1
p0(Dpx)p
nX
k=1

@xk
@pi
  @x
i
@pk

pk(p
0Dpjx)
and this matrix should be symmetric.
Conversely, let there be a function x(p) such that Sij is symmetric, and set
w (p) = p0x (p). Dierentiating, we get equations (20) and (21) so that S = S0 is
equivalent to s = s0. But the symmetry condition s = s0 is equivalent to (! dw)^
d! = 0. Therefore, there exist two functions (p) and V (p) such that ! dw = dV .
This completes the proof. 
This solves the mathematical integration problem. The necessary and sucient
condition for mathematical integration is the symmetry of the matrix
(22) S = Dpx+
1
p0(Dpx)p
((Dpx)
0  Dpx)pp0(Dpx)
It is the natural generalization of the Slutsky matrix. Indeed, in the case when the
income is independent of prices, w (p) = y, the Marshallian demand has the form
x (p; y). Relation (19) becomes:X
k
@xk
@pi
pk + x
i = 0
and since x (p; y) is positively homogeneous of degree zero:X
k
@xi
@pk
pk +
@xi
@y
y = 0
Its follows that p0Dpx(p) =  x(p) and p0Dpx(p)p =  y. Consequently, the sym-
metry condition Sij = Sji is equivalent to
Sij =
@xi
@pj
  1
y
( xi + @x
i
@y
y)( xj) = Sji = @x
j
@pi
  1
y
( xj + @x
j
@y
y)( xi)
Canceling similar terms from both sides, we end up with
@xi
@pj
+
@xi
@y
xj =
@xj
@pi
+
@xj
@y
xi
which are the standard Slutsky conditions. By comparing the matrix S with the
Slutsky matrix one can argue that the second part of the matrix S given by
1
p0(Dpx)p
((Dpx)
0  Dpx)pp0(Dpx)
is the income eect. When the price of some good changes, the income eect
represents the change in demand that results from the change in real income of
the consumer. Notice that demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero when
income is price independent. Moreover, zero homogeneity implies that the price
vector belongs to the null space of the Slutsky matrix.
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Demand functions that we consider in this section are not homogeneous of degree
zero. Consequently, Sp 6= 0. More precisely
Sp = (Dpx(p))
0p 6= 0
We conclude that the price vector doesn't belong to the null space to our extended
Slutsky matrix unless income is price independent or demand functions are homo-
geneous of degree zero.
3.2. Economic integration. We begin, as above, by a simple necessary condition
Lemma 3. Let x(p) be an individual demand function with convex income function
w(p). Then, the matrix Dpx(p) D2ppw(p) is negative semidenite on the subspace
fDpw(p)  x(p)g?.
Proof. Using equation (10), we can write
(23) Dpx(p) D2ppw(p) =  
1
(p)
D2ppV (p) +
1
(p)
(Dp(p))(Dpw(p)  x(p))0
Since the indirect utility function is quasiconvex, D2ppV is positive semidenite on
the subspace
fDpV (p)g? = fDpw(p)  x(p)g?
It follows that for any vector  2 fDpw(p)  x(p)g?, we have
0Dpx(p)   0D2ppw(p)  0
which is the desired result. 
We conclude from the last inequality that Dpx(p) could be either positive or
negative semidenite on fDpw(p)   x(p)g?. Moreover, if the income is price in-
dependent, the last theorem states that the Jaccobian matrix Dpx(p) is negative
semidenite on fx(p)g? which follows from the negative semideniteness of the
Slutsky matrix.
We shall rewrite this condition under a form that involves the partial derivatives
of x(p) only. To this end, we dene the matrix T whose ij-entry is given by
(24) Tij (p) =
X
k
@2xk
@pj@pi
pk +
@xj
@pi
Corollary 1. Let x(p) be an individual demand function such that the income
function w(p) is convex. Then the restriction of the matrix T on the subspace
fp0Dpx(p)g? is symmetric and positive semidenite.
Proof. Dierentiating the budget constraint we get
(25)
X
k
@xk
@pi
pk + x
i =
@w
@pi
We write this equation in matrix form as Dpw(p)   x(p) = p0Dpx(p) from which
we conclude that fDpw(p)   x(p)g? = fp0Dpx(p)g?. Dierentiating both sides of
equation (25) with respect to pj , we getX
k
@2xk
@pj@pi
pk +
@xj
@pi
+
@xi
@pj
=
@2w
@pj@pi
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Using matrix notation, this becomes:
T (p) +Dpx(p) = D
2
ppw(p)
It follows that we can write (23) in the following form
(26) T =
1
(p)
D2ppV (p) 
1
(p)
(Dp(p))(p
0Dpx(p))0
The result follows from the last equality. 
Note an immediate consequence:
Corollary 2. The restriction of Dpx(p) to fp0Dpx(p)g? is symmetric.
To nd a necessary and sucient condition for economic integration, we apply
the results of Chiappori-Ekeland and Ekeland-Nirenberg [9].
Theorem 6. Let x(p) and w(p) be given functions that satisfy the following con-
ditions:
(a): p0x(p) = w(p).
(b): w(p) is convex.
(c): The matrix S given by (22) is symmetric.
(d): The restriction to fp0Dpx(p)g? of the matrix T given by (24) is positive
denite.
Dene ! =
P
xidpi. Then, locally there exist two functions (p) and V (p) such
that ! = dV + dw where (p) is positive and V (p) is quasiconvex.
Proof. We apply theorem (4). Let us dene the dierential 1-form 
 by

 = !   dw
By Theorem 5, d
 = d! and 
 ^ d
 = 0. Using the notation of theorem (4), we
have k = 1, I = fj ^ 
 = 0g and S = spanf
g. Its clear that 
 2 I and that
S? = spanfp0Dpx(p)g?.
Consider the matrix:

ij =
@xi
@pj
  @
2w
@pj@pi
The restriction of (
ij) to a subspace of codimension one is symmetric and negative
denite according to (24) and hypothesis (d). It follows from the Ekeland-Nirenberg
Theorem that there exist two functions (p) and v(p) such that (p) > 0, v(p) is
concave and 
 = dv. It follows that ! = dv + dw which gives
xi(p) = (p)
@v
@pi
+
@w
@pi
Setting (p) = 1(p) > 0 and V (p) =  v(p), V (p) is convex since v(p) is concave,
we have:
@V
@pi
= (p)

@w
@pi
  xi(p)

where V (p) is convex and therefore is quasiconvex. The function V (p) is an indirect
utility function and (p) is the Lagrange multiplier. From V , we can nd the
direct utility function U(x) for the individual whose demand function is x(p). This
completes the proof. 
12 MARWAN ALOQEILI
4. The homogeneous case
In this section, we adopt the additional assumption that the income function
w(p) is homogeneous of degree one. Therefore, the demand function x(p) and the
indirect utility function V (p) are homogeneous of degree zero. We proceed now
as in the previous section while performing the necessary modications implied
by the homogeneity conditions. The following theorem solves the mathematical
integration problem in the homogeneous case.
Theorem 7. Let ! be a dierential 1-form dened as above where x(p) is a solution
of problem (P) such that p0x(p) = w(p) and w(p) is convex and homogeneous of
degree one. Then, ! can be decomposed as ! = dV + dw in the neighbourhood of
a point p if and only if there is some 1-form  =
P
idpi satisfyingX
pi
i (p) = 1
such that, for all i; j, we have:
(27)
@xi
@pj
  i
X
k
@xk
@pj
pk =
@xj
@pi
  j
X
k
@xk
@pi
pk
in a neighbourhood of p.
Proof. As above, the necessary and sucient condition is:
(28) d! =  ^ (!   dw)
Let us apply the vector eld  =
P
pi
@
@pi
to both sides of this equation. Notice
rst that, since w(p) is homogeneous of degree one and x(p) is homogeneous of
degree zero, we have from Euler's identity
nX
i=1
@w
@pi
pi = w(p) and
nX
i=1
@xj
@pi
pi = 0; j = 1; :::; n
It follows that:
(29) d!(; :) =< ;  > (!   dw)   < !   dw;  >
But
< !   dw;  > = < !;  >   < dw;  > = w   w = 0:
Therefore, equality (29) reduces to d!(; :) = < ;  > (!   dw). Recall that
d!(; :) =
X
i;j
@xi
@pj
pjdpi  
X
i;j
@xi
@pj
pidpj
The rst term vanishes because x(p) is homogeneous of degree zero. We end up
with
d!(; :) =  
X
i;j
@xi
@pj
pidpj =< ;  > (!   dw)
This equation can be written under the form
(30) d!(; :) =< ;  >
X
j

xj(p)  @w
@pj

dpj
Dierentiating the budget constraint once, we get x(p)   Dpw(p) =  p0Dpx(p).
Equation (30) can be written as d!(; :) = < ;  > d!(; :). We conclude that the
dierential 1-form  must satisfy < ;  > = 1.
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We now go back to (28). Set  =
Pn
j=1 
jdpj . Using the fact that x(p)  
Dpw(p) =  p0Dpx(p), equation (28) can be written asX
i<j

@xi
@pj
  @x
j
@pi

dpj ^ dpi =  
X
i<j
 
j
X
k
@xk
@pi
pk   i
X
k
@xk
@pj
pk
!
dpj ^ dpi
This equality is satised if and only if
(31)
@xi
@pj
  i
X
k
@xk
@pj
pk =
@xj
@pi
  j
X
k
@xk
@pi
pk
Where  is any dierential 1-form that satises the condition < ;  > = 1. The
proof is complete. 
Its clear that the price vector p belongs to the null space of the matrix obtained
in theorem (7). Notice that the demand function can be written under the form
x(p; w(p)) and the budget constraint is p0x(p; w(p)) = w(p). Dierentiating both
sides with respect to w, we get
nX
k=1
@xk
@w
pk = 1
Then, we can take  to be the 1-form dened by
 =
nX
k=1
@xk
@w
dpk
Its clear that  satises the condition < ;  > = 1. By taking i = @x
i
@w , the
symmetry condition (31) takes the form
(32)
@xi
@pj
  @x
i
@w
X
k
@xk
@pj
pk =
@xj
@pi
  @x
j
@w
X
k
@xk
@pi
pk
If w(p) = y then the above matrix is the Slutsky matrix sinceX
k
@xk
@pi
pk =  xi
Another possible choice for  is
 =
1
p0p
X
j
pjdpj
Its clear that  satises the condition < ;  >= 1. For this choice of , the
symmetry condition (31) takes the form
(33)
@xi
@pj
  pi
p0p
X
k
@xk
@pj
pk =
@xj
@pi
  pj
p0p
X
k
@xk
@pi
pk
We have the same symmetry and negative semideniteness as before. We state the
following theorem for which we omit the proof.
Theorem 8. If x(p) is a solution of problem (P) that is homogenous of degree zero,
then Dpx(p) is symmetric and negative semidenite on the subspace fp0Dpx(p)g?.
Notice that all results of the previous section, except theorem (5), hold including
theorem (6) that solves the economic integration problem.
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5. Two particular cases
5.1. Case 1: An exchange economy. In this section we consider a simple ex-
change economy in which the income of the consumer is simply the value of his
endowment e 2 Rn+ so that the income function w(p) = p0e is a linear function of p.
In this case we have Dpw = p and D
2
pw = 0. It follows that equality (11) becomes
0Dpx(p) =
 1
(p)
0D2pV (p) + 
0Dp(p)
(p)
(x(p)  e)0
This condition means that the Jacobian matrix of x is negative semidenite on the
space orthogonal to the Spanfe   xg. In other words, if we dene the dierential
1-form  as
 =
nX
i=1
(xi(p)  ei)dpi
then the rst order conditions for constrained maximum imply that  =  1(p)dV
which is equivalent to  ^ d = 0. Using the constraint p0x(p) = p0e, we haveX
k
@xk
@pi
pk =  (xi(p)  ei)
In this case, the symmetry condition (32) can be written as
@xi
@pj
+
@xi
@w
(xj   ej) = @x
j
@pi
+
@xj
@w
(xi   ei)
This is indeed the Slutsky matrix in an exchange economy. It is symmetric and
negative semidenite.
In this simple economy, the initial endowment of the consumer is given which
determines, in turn, the income function of the consumer. Notice again that if
the consumer's income is price independent; that is, w(p) = y that ei = 0 for
i = 1; :::; n and the above symmetry condition means that the Slutsky matrix
S = Dpx+ (Dyx)x
0 is symmetric.
5.2. Case 2: An economy with production. We give now another example of
an economy in which the income of the consumer depends on prices. This is an
economy with production.
Consider a private ownership economy in which consumers own shares in rms
whose prots are distributed to shareholders. For any rm j, consumer i's owner-
ship is represented by a number 0  ij  1. We require that Pi ij = 1 for any
rm j. We assume that there are J rms in this economy.
Let Y be the total production set of the economy. That is Y = Y 1+:::+Y J , where
Y j is the production possibility set for rm j. We assume that the total production
set is closed, strictly convex and satises the free disposal property. The strict
convexity assumption rules out constant and increasing returns to scale economies.
Under these assumptions, the prot function and the net supply function are well
dened and satisfy a set of important properties.
Denote by yj(p) the net supply function of rm j which is simply the function
that associates to each vector p the prot maximizing net output vector at those
prices. The vector-valued function yj(p) is homogeneous of degree zero, Dpyj is
symmetric and positive semidenite and (Dpyj)p = 0.
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It follows that the prot of rm j is wj(p) = p
0yj(p), where yj = (y1j ; :::; y
n
j ) 2 Rn.
The negative entries of the vector yj should be interpreted as demand for inputs.
The prot function wj(p) is convex, homogeneous of degree one and Dpwj = yj(p).
For more details and proofs, see Mas-Colell et al [10].
In this setting, a typical consumer's income can arise from two sources, from
selling an endowment of commodities e 2 Rn+ and from shares in the prots of
any number of rms. Let p 2 Rn++ be the vector of prices, the consumer's budget
constraint is
p0xi  p0ei +
X
j
ijwj(p)
where x 2 Rn+ is a commodity bundle and wj(p) is the prot function of rm j. It
follows that consumer i solves the following problem
maxxi U
i(xi)
p0xi = p0ei +
P
j 
ijwj(p)
So we have an income function for consumer i that takes the form wi(p) = p0ei +P
j 
ijwj(p). This income function is homogenous of degree one and convex. If we
omit the index i, the consumer's objective in this economy is to maximize the utility
function U(x) subject to the constraint p0x = w(p) where w(p) is homogeneous of
degree one and convex. That is; we have an individual problem of the type (P)
for which the solution and the value function (the indirect utility function) are
homogenous of degree zero and the indirect utility function is quasiconvex.
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